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I. INTRODUCTION
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925 directed the Corps of Engineers to survey the potential
of the Columbia River for power, navigation, flood control and irrigation development. The
Corps' response arrived in 1932, as the New Deal was searching for public works
opportunities to put people to work. In other quarters there were reservations that the power
output from large dams could ever be put to work in a region that was sparsely settled and
largely agrarian, with little industry and that distant from most usable dam sites.
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Nonetheless, construction work began in 1933. Bonneville Dam was completed in 1938;
Grand Coulee in 1941. Today there are eleven large mainstem dams on the Columbia River
below the Canadian border. Including the Snake and other major tributaries, there are 138
US dams, public and private, generating hydroelectricity as a principal or ancillary purpose.
Sixty percent of the firm electric energy generated in the Pacific Northwest comes from
hydroelectricity, and almost 70% of the capacity.
Of nearly equal importance, storage of water behind some of the dams allows power to be
shaped to the fluctuating demands of customers. Storage backs up other sources of
generation, producing a product that is higher quality and higher value because it is reliable
and available on demand.
Under the terms of the Columbia River Treaty of 1961, a series of projects was constructed
on the upper Columbia in Canada that altogether doubled the total available storage capacity
of the system (including the Canadian portion of the Libby Dam reservoir, which extends 42
miles into Canada from the project site in northwestern Montana). Some 20 MAF was made
available to the US for power generation and flood control, the two authorized uses of the
stored water. With the added storage, more generators and power houses could be
constructed on dams below the border.
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The hydroelectric project construction boom lasted for forty years, ending with the

completion of Lower Granite Dam on the Snake River in 1975. In that period virtually every
free-flowing stretch of the river from Bonneville to Columbia Lake in Canada was
transformed into slack-water reservoir. The only exception, Hanford Reach, escaped the
intrusion of the planned Ben Franklin Dam only by virtue of the security requirements of the
government's Hanford Nuclear Reservation. There are still Ben Franklin boosters in the
communities of central Washington that are prospering from irrigated agriculture.
This making and harnessing of the industrial Columbia River has contributed substantially to
a prosperous regional economy, including low cost power for aluminum and pulp and paper
processing, irrigated agriculture, and a barge transportation system that transships wheat
from Montana and the Dakotas to markets across the Pacific.
The storage dams also drastically modified the Columbia River's hydrograph, shifting water
forward from one summer into the following winter when power loads rise.
With construction of the Canadian storage facilities, Congress in 1964 authorized the sale of
surplus power to the Pacific Southwest via high voltage transmission Intertie.
The linkage between the river, the power system and transmission was reinforced with
Congressional passage of the Transmission Act of 1974.
Each installment of generating capability required and presupposed the transmission capacity
to move power to customer loads. Without transmission capacity, the dams could not and
would not have been built. This is an historical fact essential to reconciling the industrial
Columbia River with the biological one.
II Utility Competition, Endangered Salmon and BPA
A. For half a century BPA-marketed power was the benchmark low cost electricity in the
Pacific Northwest; and the region enjoyed the lowest power rates in the country. After
1980, three events combined to force BPA into a struggle to offer competitively-priced
power, and even to survival
I. WPPSS
In the state of Washington, five nuclear plants were conceived in 1960's and
brought under construction in the 1970's. Folding in the costs of three plants -two unfinished shells and a completed, but hugely uneconomic, WPPSS II -resulted in BPA's wholesale power rates rising some 600% in the early 1980's.
2

2.

Endangered Salmon
The causes of the declines are many and complex, but two principally implicate
the hydropower system.
The first is habitat. Dams and huge, warm slackwater reservoir pools have
transformed the mainstem habitat of the fish. Critical needs for food, cool water,
protection from predators, conservation of energy during migration, all have
become far more difficult for the fish to obtain
The second is institutional. BPA, the federal owners of most of the dams, and
the utility owners of the rest, have historically operated river flows for flood
control and power generation. Their objectives and authorities have been isolated
from governance of the rest of the river's production and health. The
hydropower system has locked in an operational status quo that is difficult to
move or modify, and that is not integrated with either other uses of the river, or
its conservation needs.
In 1991 and 1992 three populations of Snake River salmon were listed under the
Endangered Species Act. While many parties shared recovery responsibilities,
the largest portion has been carried by the federal hydropower system. Direct
costs are in excess of $200 mm annually (from a budget of about $2.5 billion).
BA also counts as opportunity costs the flows that are diverted from its turbines
to spill fish over dams, or that is moved from times optimum for power
generation to times optimum for fish migration.
In 1996 a new scientific report altered the terms of regional engagement in salmon
recovery. The Power Council's Independent Scientific Group (now the ISAB)
issued its "Return to the River" paper (Williams et al, Return to the River.
NPPC 1996). The paper carefully does not advocate particular measures, but
projects the idea of the "normative" river: a river whose functions more closely
approximate the undeveloped river, thereby more likely supporting the historical
needs of indigenous species such as salmon. Given the massive modification of
the normative river represented by hydropower development, the report has vast
potential implications for BPA and the other river managers.

3.

Competition Comes to the Electric Power Industry

A chain reaction of events that began with the first oil embargo in the early 1970's
has led, among other outcomes, to far lower power industry entry barriers and far
lower generating costs in the 1990's. Low-cost, modular gas-fired combustion
turbines have driven the market cost of new electricity supplies down to two cents
a kilowatt, less than half of the cost projected as recently as 1990. Some shortterm deals have shaved another half-cent off the asking price. Non-traditional
suppliers, brokers, futures traders, all have emerged to ride this fuel- and
technology-led bow wave. They have combined with large industrial consumers
of electricity to pry open the traditional closed, monopolized service territories of
regulated utilities. Utilities are fighting back with whatever weapons they can lay
their hands to: delay, mergers, stranded cost recovery rules.
BPA is more likely than most utilities to be left adrift by this industry
restructuring. Historically its position had been impregnable. It had the lowest
cost power. It controlled most of the transmission system (blocking BC hydro
from the California market, for example). The only significant interconnection
that might admit competition was the Southwest Intertie, the northern access to
which it controlled.
Because of this position, BPA never needed the protection of a regulatory
compact. It had an obligation to supply Northwest customers with wholesale
power at cost. The customers had no obligation to buy from BPA, but neither
had they the ability or the incentive to buy elsewhere. BPA could maintain fat
staff and consultant payrolls, carry conservation and other public purpose costs,
and provide an assortment of subsidies to customers. On behalf of its customers,
it could take on obligations such as WPPSS and raise rates accordingly, protected
by regional insularity and its price margin. The concern was never that BPA
was too weak to enforce reciprocal obligations with its customers; but that it was
so strong the customers needed leverage to control the agency, leverage they
obtained through the region's Congressional delegation.
4. BPA In A Box
As the region approaches the expiration of the 20 year customer contracts signed
in 1980, BPA finds itself exposed. It is vulnerable to competitors luring away its
customers with offers designed to build market share at the agency's expense.
WPPSS costs eat up 25%-30% of BPA'S annual budget, while selling the agency
over-market-cost power from WPPSS II that must be resold at a loss. The
WPPSS capital debt is not paid off until 2018.
4
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Some of the customers for whom the WPPSS acquisitions were transacted have
signaled they will move on to new suppliers at the earliest opportunity, cutting
their costs but leaving BPA with stranded WPPSS costs to spread on fewer
customers, thereby driving these remaining few away. While investor-owned
utilities are succeeding in getting transition assistance from their regulators in the
form of stranded cost charges that will follow customers who take their business
elsewhere, BPA's options for such recovery are limited by its one-way deals with
its customers.
If anything approaching a normative river is to be achieved, it will involve higher
costs to BPA, and possibly loss of the output at one or more projects if reservoir
drawdown proposals proceed.
Bonneville is in a box. It cannot hope to escape to easier times much this side of
2018, when the capital debt for the WPPSS plants is finally retired.
II The Governors' Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System
A.

In 1996 the Governors of Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington convened a panel
of 15 persons representing utilities, customers, and public interest groups, to consider
and recommend changes in the region's electric power system. It is significant that
tribal representatives were conspicuously absent.

B.

Defining the Problem
The group began by accepting the Governors' definition of the problem to be solved: a
narrow definition that began with an outcome -- how to protect regional access to lowcost hydropower -- instead of the underlying problem -- how to redress problems of
river overuse and fragmented management.
1.

The "Industrial River" Definition
How do we redesign the "institutional structure of the region's electric utility
industry" to conform to a coming competitive marketplace, take advantage of the
market's efficiencies but protect parties from its rougher edges, at least for a
transition period? Then, can we/should we continue to support the public
purposes (conservation/renewable energy/fish and wildlife) that have historically
been assigned to utilities? Finally, what does this mean, if anything, for the
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river?
2. An Ecosystem Definition
Among the many roles and uses of the river, what are the priorities? Flood
control? Commercial navigation? Irrigation? Power generation? Conservation of
its biologic health? Are the rules and institutions we have in place likely to realize
these priorities? If not, what changes should be made? How shall the modified
river conservation-management system be made compatible with the most
efficient and economical hydropower system, and with a competitive electric
power industry? Is there a place for BPA in this redesign? Will BPA's
operational role and financial condition allow it to take this place?
C. Agenda: Four Issues, One Omission
1.

Consumer Access
How should the region's electric energy marketplace be opened to competition,
giving customers access to a choice of suppliers? How should we deal with the
equity issues raised by customers with, and without, market power? Who wins,
who loses? Shall there be transition periods, cushions, new institutional
protections for small consumers?

2.

Transmission
What institutional arrangements can be designed for a transmission system that is
independent of buyers and sellers, will assure the most efficient transactions, and
maintain reliability standards? How does BPA's substantial control over regional
transmission comport with this goal?

3.

BPA Power Marketing
Is a government-owned and operated wholesale electric utility compatible with an
open, competitive market? How can BPA rearrange its business, and its
customer relationships, to generate sufficient revenue to fully meet its obligations,
including WPPSS payments and fish recovery? Are some historical features of
the regional system -- preference to publically-owned utilities; power at cost;
subsidies; special arrangements with aluminum companies -- open to review and
modification? Should historical customers reserve the right to leave BPA for
6

better near-term deals, then return when WPPSS costs are liquidated and BPA is
competitive again? What cost exposure is home by the US Treasury, as BPA's
"shareholder?" Is there a stranded cost mechanism BPA can apply to departing
customers, to assess them a "fair share" of the system costs BPA incurred -especially WPPSS and fish recovery -- on their behalf?
4.

Public Purposes
The region's historical support for energy conservation, renewable energy
technology development, and consumer protection are at risk. What changes
might mitigate this risk and still be compatible with a competitive market?

D. Missing from the Agenda
1. Columbia River Conservation and Governance
How should the river be managed and conserved; and for what objectives and
purposes? How will river governance be affected by evolving power markets?
By different conceptions of BPA's future role? How will BPA, and power
markets, be affected by uncertainty over fish recovery costs and modifications of
the hydropower system? Is an independent transmission system (including legal
separation of BPA transmission from BPA power marketing) compatible with
fish recovery?
IV. Accomplishments of the Comprehensive Review
A. Utility System Issues: Considerable progress on most issues, including an acceptable
public purposes package (see the Comprehensive Review Final Report, NPPC 96CR26, December 12, 1996).
1.

Recommended legislatures provide open access for all customers by 1999, with
consumer protections.

2.

Recommended creation of an Independent Grid Operator to manage all traffic on
the region's transmission grid, with responsibility for efficiency and reliability in
dispatching power per bilateral supplier/customer agreements. Recommended
BPA be "legally" separated, with transmission function performed independently
of power marketing to avoid self-dealing or the appearance thereof.
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3.

Recommended that for ten years, 3% of the region's power sales revenues be
applied to conservation, renewable energy projects, and low-income energy
assistance. Distribution utilities would continue to have a central role in
disbursing, and possibly collecting the funds. However, the Review left to the
States and/or public utility boards the discretion to determine funding methods.

4.

Recommended a "subscription" process for BPA to follow in marketing power.
Traditional customers would exercise their preference to power-at-cost as now,
but customers signing short (5 to 10 year) contracts would pay an option fee for
the continuing right to power-at-cost. Interrupted service would come back only
at market rates.

B. River Issues: Efforts by some participants forced river issues onto the table, but not to
affirmative outcomes.
1.

Governance
The Review concluded "that we cannot expect to achieve both the degree of cost
stability the electric industry requires to maintain the benefits of the Columbia
River power system. .. and achieve sustainable fish restoration unless we ensure
predictability, accountability and effective governance for the fish and wildlife
interests of the river." But many Review members did not want to bring river
governance up in the Review, or make any recommendation.

2.

Fish Settlement
Some fish advocates argued that they would resist regional power industry
restructuring absent a comprehensive agreement, or settlement, of outstanding
fish recovery issues: particularly, a decision to proceed to drawdown or dam
breaching on the Snake River and at John Day Dam on the Lower Columbia. The
proposition was never taken seriously in the Review, and the strategy of holding
up regional restructuring has generally failed for want of political leverage.

V. Failures of the Comprehensive Review
A. Power System
The Review, having no authority except to make recommendations to the Governors
who empaneled it, now must rely on state legislatures to implement many of the
8

regulatory and funding choices necessary to the power system redesign. Idaho and
Washington have already determined not to act in their 1997 sessions. Montana and
Oregon are open questions still.
Utilities and other customers are meeting to construct a subscription system, and to
implement legal separation of BPA's transmission and power marketing functions.
Both processes are compromised by the Review's failures to deal with fish costs (a)
directly, and (b) through a stranded cost recovery mechanism as a tool for funding
future costs (and aligning customer incentives).
B. Fish Recovery and Ecosystem Conservation
The larger failures of the Review have to do with leaving fish and river conservation
issues ill-defined and undecided.
At the outset of the Review, the tribes were assured that only power system issues
would be addressed, not fish. This was a preposterous fiction, given the region's
reliance on hydropower and on the BPA transmission system. Nevertheless the
Governors' offices maintained it and the tribes accepted it as convenient. The tribes
have since realized that once again the needs of the power system and its customers
have come first, the river second.
The fish representative was the sole dissenting vote, arguing the Review should
have addressed:
1.

Whether recommendations "improve the ability of the power system to meet its
fish and wildlife obligations."

2.

Whether other, neglected changes could improve that ability.

3.

Whether recommendations "undermine the fish and wildlife obligations of the
nation and the region (to the tribes, among others).

4.

Whether the continued purchase of power "at cost" clearly includes the costs of
fish and wildlife restoration.

.

Whether the benefits of the river will be shared fairly.

6. Whether "we can establish a system of power and river governance that will
effectively change the operation of the power system in order to restore fish and
9

wildlife populations in the Basin."
7.

Absence of "specific commitments to actions thatwill restore the biological health
and productivity of the Columbia River."

These boil down to two critical issues: paying for fish recovery, and reforming river
governance.
C. Paying for fish recovery
The Review did not propose any changes to existing regional/BPA budgets for fish
recovery. These budgets do not contemplate any substantial reconfiguration of the
hydropower system. Only limited changes are anticipated: continued reliance on
barges to move + 50% of fish downriver could be aided by new surface bypass
facilities; gas saturation problems at spillways could be mitigated by flip-lip and other
modifications. No significant changes in pool elevations, deep drawdowns or dam
breaching are presently fundable.
A proposal to contemplate an additional $500 mm annually, contingent on
Congressional appropriations, was considered but not included. In the end, the
Review deferred fish funding issues. They are now under discussion in regional work
groups implementing the subscription and transmission Review proposals.
There are four sources for increased fish funding: (1) Costcutting; (2) BPA power
sales revenues; (3) BPA transmission services revenues; (4) stranded cost recovery by
BPA (of WPPSS costs; of deferred fish costs); (5) deferring scheduled BPA payments
of its debt to the US Treasury.
1.

Costcutting
BPA has already reduced costs, especially personnel costs, substantially. The
agency promises additional savings, trying to lower power rates to two cents per
kilowatt hour by 2000. Can the agency come up with more savings still, to fund
fish recovery? More likely are cuts in fish funding so BPA can reach its two
cents goal.
BPA still supports subsidies to some users (e.g. irrigators; rural customers) that
could be taken back, although this would be politically difficult and might require
legislation.
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2.

Power Sales Revenues

To keep its historic utility customers, BPA cannot charge them more than market
rates even if this means BPA revenues fall short of financial obligations. In turn,
the utilities fear losing their customers -- especially their best, largest customers -to predatory suppliers cream-skimming and seeking market share.
However, the market value of BPA power can be enhanced with incentives
including resale rights, a BPA repurchase obligation, a customer option to reserve
its power-at-cost rights for when WPPSS debt is gone, and offsetting power
sales payments against any stranded cost obligation.
3.

Transmission Revenues
BPA power sales and transmission revenues are collectively pledged to meet its
full agency obligations. Many buyers and sellers in the new electricity
marketplace want functions and revenues separated, to avoid cross-subsidies and
self-dealing. Only transmission costs, they argue, should go into transmission
rates. Fish costs are generation costs, and should stay on that side of the wall.
The power industry is especially concerned that BPA might use its position
astride the region's transmission system to recovery stranded costs through a
"wires" charge.
Fish advocates argue that transmission and generation are a single integrated
system. Moreover, BPA statute requires the agency to apply its revenues to meet
its full obligations, without regard to the origin of the revenues.
Practically, there are limits to how much added revenue BPA could pull from
transmission before the market responded with bypass strategies.

4.

Stranded Cost Recovery
There is no question BPA is hamstrung by costs -- for WPPSS; for fish -- that in
the plain meaning of the term may be stranded in a competitive industry.
However, these costs are not necessarily stranded as FERC has defined and
narrowed the term. If BPA can meet its present obligations, including the costs
of uneconomic nuclear plants averaged with low-cost hydroelectricity, it may not
11

meet the technical definition of a stranded costs.
But BPA's costs are WPPSS compounded with fish. . . and with potentially
rising future fish costs. Can prospective (because they were deferred) costs be
stranded? In California, PG&E is filing a proposal with the state PUC to recover
just such prospective "transition costs."
There are other hurdles BPA and the region must surmount to devise a recovery
mechanism that is sufficient but not open-ended, that is equitable, and that can be
recovered by other means than a wires charge. Absent such a mechanism, BPA
will have to set a wires charge at what the market will bear.
Deferring Treasury Payments
The last hand in BPA's pocket each year is Treasury, after WPPSS payments
(first priority) and other capital and operating costs. BPA must repay debt
incurred to build the dams and transmission system, conservation investments
and other costs. Will Treasury accept slippage in repayments owed to it?
Perhaps. Will it do so if BPA's customers are insisting on their right to power-atcost when cost is below market, and their right to secede when it is above? Will it
do so if customers are not subject to a plausible stranded cost recovery charge?
When subsidies remain in place? When the region is not stepping up to its fish
recovery costs? Maybe not.
D. Reforming River Governance
The Columbia, like other western rivers, suffers from a governance system that
matches up poorly with ecosystem conservation needs, and does not efficiently
manage cross-claims among economic users. Agencies, missions, jurisdictions,
funding and most of all priorities are confused when they are not in outright conflict.
Institutions for coordination and accountability are weak or flawed. Many observers
have commented that there is no one in charge of salmon recovery; and anyone put in
charge would be confounded by the contradictory authorities that fragment the basin.
The result is that a system which US District Judge Malcolm Marsh said "literally cries
out for major overhaul" but is destined still for "small steps, minor improvements and
adjustments ... (and) minimum disruption" (See IDFG v. NMFS, US District Court
for Oregon, Opinion issued March 28 1994).

12

Some utilities and other BPA customers participating in the Review acknowledged the
linkage between unsettled fish recovery, ineffective river governance, and uncertainty
over power costs for BPA customers. Most wanted to defer any discussion of fish
costs or river governance. Deferral was equivalent to conforming the status quo, which
for many economic users is preferable to a serious regional discussion of revising river
priorities and the institutions to ensure their observance.
VI. Conclusion
The states of the Columbia Basin, and the economic users of the river, have defined their
problem narrowly, and crafted a narrow solution to it. The problem, in the words of the
Pacific Northwest House delegation, is how to "retain the benefits of the Columbia River
basin's hydroelectric system for the region," while satisfying "the region's obligations to the
United States Treasury" (See Letter of March 17, 1997, signed by seventeen Pacific
Northwest House Members).
But narrow solutions will be durable ones only if the region is hardened to the loss of
Columbia River salmon and steelhead, and to the declining biological health of the river.
There are contradictions between those ecosystem values and functions, and the way the river
is operated today for power and other economic uses.
As things now stand, BPA is unlikely to have a subscription process successful enough to
generate revenues sufficient to pay fish costs. If such costs are forced by legal action -Treaty rights litigation, for example -- the region is more likely than not to default on its
Treasury debt. When that happens, when the region shows up on Treasury's doorstep, the
rest of Congress and the country will not be sympathetic. There will be calls to sell off the
dams, and to privatize the system under FERC licenses (which will do irreparable harm to
any prospects for ecosystem conservation). If Treasury is to pay the bills, Treasury will
capture the benefits whenever they materialize. The hydroelectric system will be lost to the
region, because the region was unwilling to shoulder the responsibilities and pay the bills that
go with it. And the river will be no better off for the abandonment of regional responsibility.
Yet the region persists in addressing hydropower system concerns as though they can be
divorced from ecological ones. A revealing moment came toward the close of the Review,
during intense debate over whether a stranded cost recovery mechanism should be
recommended. Several alternatives were considered, and analyzed for impacts on users.
The bar charts showed effects on large BPA customers and small; on customers who kept
their loads with BPA, on customers who departed, and on the US Treasury. There was no
bar on the charts to reflect the benefits to the region of recovered fish populations and a
13
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biologically healthy river.
Proposals that included paying for significant changes in dams and hydropower operations to
benefit fish were, unsurprisingly, the most costly. They involved missed payments to
Treasury or stranded cost recoveries from customers, or both. The Review Chairman
dismissed all these efforts with the sweeping statement that no proposal would survive that
could not show positive benefits to all parties .. . by which he meant customers, utilities,
and the Treasury. Positive benefits for the fish and the river were not the concern of this
Review.
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A Discussion of Proposals for Restructuring
the Pacific Northwest Power System
Executive Summary
The ways we have managed the Columbia River and allocated its benefits over
the last half century, for power generation and multiple other uses, stand to be
radically transformed in the next several years.
Over the last year many regional voices have urged a comprehensive review of
river and power system issues. The region's Congressional delegation and
Governors have responded by establishing two parallel processes: a reconsideration
of Columbia Basin governance structures under the aegis of the Power Planning
Council; and a Governors' Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System.
This paper consists of a model for the region's power system that begins with
the same "givens" employed in the Review, but recasts and reprioritizes the goals. It
then infers from these goals the industry structure that could be expected to deliver
them. While political considerations may delay or deflect optimal solutions, that is all
the more reason for understanding clearly what is optimal, and foregone.

Goals (in rough priority sequence)
1.

Maintain the maximum long-term public benefit from the Columbia River as an
environmental and economic public resource.

2.

Achieve long-term energy sustainability.

3.

Retain the benefits of the region's existing low cost resources for the region.

4.

Assure affordable access to electricity for consumers with the least market power.

5.

Substitute efficiently functioning competitive markets for regulated power industry
activity wherever possible.

6.

Assure adequacy of supply and reliability of operation.

7.

Assure fairness.

8.

Provide accountability.

Outcomes
1. The Federal hydropower generating system -- facilities ownership. and Power
marketing function -- should remain in public ownership. This is necessary to
arrest and reverse the historical fragmenting of authority over the river's multiple

uses; and to provide for conservation of its biological health as the primary
management objective. Hydropower operations should be more closely
integrated into river management, not further dispersed and not apportioned to
users who do not share public stewardship responsibilities. The Regional
Review and Basin Governance processes should be reconstituted as a single
enquiry at the earliest possible juncture.
2. The value of the region's investment in the Federal power system should be
reserved to the region and to the public interest. Actions taken to optimize this
value should be consistent with river conservation. Existing subsidies and
transfer payments should be phased out unless they are rejustified in terms of
contemporary public policy objectives.
3. BPA's power marketing role needs to be redesigned to limit its influence in
competitive cower markets, while assuring that its products bring market-driven
returns to the region.
4.

BPA transmission assets should be detached from the agency's cower marketing
and other functions and joined with all other available regional transmission
facilities in an independently-operated ISO or TRANSCO. However, SPA and
the region should receive and reserve for public use the full value of the region's
equity investment in these assets.

5. BPA net revenues, if any. should be available to leverage longer investment
horizons for energy efficiency and renewable resources.
6. There should be state-by-state policies applicable to all enemy suppliers that
minimum level of
consumers.
7. Governance of Columbia River operations. including_shared ownership of
Federal hydroelectric system assets, watershed restoration and maintenance
land oversiaht of relevant Federal management and oversight agencies). and
lona-term power planning. should be the responsibility of a reorganized
Northwest Power Planning Council that includes Federal, State and Tribal
representation. The Federal Government should agree that any SPA net
revenues generated are available for use within the region only.
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A Discussion of Proposals for Restructuring
the Pacific Northwest Power System
Introduction
The ways we have managed the Columbia River and allocated its benefits over
the last half century, for power generation and multiple other uses, stand to be
radically transformed in the next several years.
The Bonneville Power Administration has been with us in essentially its present
form since 1939; it is already undergoing dramatic reshaping, and might not last out
the decade. Public power and private utilities have skirmished over turf for years but
with little real interest in upsetting 60 years of comfortable status quo. Both are seeing
familiar ways of doing business upended.
It is less clear that the historic roles of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation in the Pacific Northwest will be re-examined, but they should be.
Over the last year many regional voices have urged a comprehensive review of
river and power system issues. The region's Congressional delegation and
Governors have responded by establishing two parallel processes: a reconsideration
of Columbia Basin governance structures under the aegis of the Power Planning
Council; and a Governors' Comprehensive Review of the Northwest Energy System
(the"Review").1
The Review commenced in January, 1996, with a notable and talented
membership and an important but still loosely-defined agenda. After two months of
labor the agenda has achieved greater clarity. More important, the substantive
1 Among other issues, this paper will address the wisdom, and potential consequences, of separating
these two enquiries.
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approach adopted by the Review has begun to suggest -- and arguably influence -- its
outcome. Now, before either this approach or its consequences have been set in
hardened concrete, alternative ways of stating issues and approaching conclusions
beg to be considered. Such alternatives may at the least illuminate the debate, forcing
assumptions to be questioned before they are embedded.
This paper is intended to provide members of the Comprehensive Review of the
Northwest Energy System, and other interested parties, with such an alternative view.

The Comprehensive Review Approach
The Review's approach, developed by its consultants, is a series of logical
steps that proceed from the general to the specific and form a "template" for use by
members in considering possible industry forms and structures. Here is that approach,
summarized:
1. "Identify the 'givens'; factors ... beyond the control of the region:" (and
therefore to be taken as assumptions).
2. "Identify the goals ...(for the) future power system."
3. "Identify . . . structural changes required by the givens and goals."
4. "Identify the desired structure .... Determine the degree to which and how
public purposes might be maintained and identify the role, if any, of
regional oversight and planning within that structure."
The Review chair made clear that this approach and the templates were to
provoke thought and discussion, that it was not the only approach and was not to be
taken as preemptive.
It is certainly plausible to reason from the general to the specific. However, the
consultants selected, and the Review so far has concurred in, general factors that are
largely power system attributes -- efficiency, reliability, low costs to customers,
consistency with competitive market models. Other featurea -- public purposes, and
regional oversight and planning, will then be fit "... within that structure." Presumably
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either there is then a fit, or public purposes are modified to achieve one, or the
structure is modified to accommodate the purposes deemed essential.
The approach invites the question whether the order in which factors are
considered may influence or predetermine outcomes. How difficult might it be for
public purposes to subsequently modify an agreed-to industry structure that meets
desired power system criteria and has become a kind of new status quo for discussion
purposes? Could one hypothesize a materially different outcome from the same set of
factors if one began with public purposes, and designed around them the most
efficient, etc. possible power system? Same ingredients, different mixing sequence.
Arguably this second approach was the one employed by our predecessors in
the 1930's. Had they set about designing the most efficient and carefully calibrated
power system then, it is unlikely they would have built Bonneville and Grand Coulee,
or supported formation of a network of public utilities. But the objectives of public
policy in the 1930's were jobs, rural electrification, irrigation water for family farms,
public power as a check on private utilities. Public interest/public policy goals were
asserted, and the power system architecture was developed around those goals.
The rest of this paper consists of an alternative model that accepts the "givens"
from the Review template, but recasts and reprioritizes the goals. It then infers from
these goals an industry structure that can reasonably be expected to deliver them.
The structure will resemble in many ways concepts the Review is actively considering,
but will depart in significant respects. The discussion is conceptual, and
acknowledges that many details will need to be added, some of which may modify the
design in significant ways. Our hope is that to the extent it provides contrasting
features and tradeoffs, it may expand the range of the region's choices beyond what
the Review presently is contemplating.

Givens
This paper largely accepts the "givens" provided by the template (Attachment A).

in

We anticipate, however, that the distinction between wholesale and "large
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retail" customers of utilities is increasingly technical rather than real; and that demands
for "increased access to the power market" combined with technology advances (e.g.,
fuel cells) will move customer choice of suppliers down the scale of customer size
more rapidly than anticipated. The relative market power of customers will
increasingly be a public issue, as those least able to afford higher costs see higher
prices, reflecting not only the reality of costs of service but also market flaws (e.g.
access to market information) that penalize such customers unfairly.

Goals
We propose to modify, and to rearrange the order of goals provided in the
template (Attachment B), and stipulate a rough hierarchy (although the objective remains
to accommodate all goals to the fullest extent possible). These should be thought of
as public policy goals, which are distinct from private industry goals, although the two
may and often will coincide.

1. Maintain the maximum long-term public benefit from the Columbia River as an
environmental and economic public resource. Conservation of the river's
health -- developing and respecting science-driven standards of hydrological
and biological health -- should be established as the highest and best use of
the river and as the primary management objective, with other uses
accommodated equitably thereafter. Seek collaborative mechanisms for
balancing local, regional, national and Canadian interests in the river.

2. Achieve long-term energy sustainability through a resource investment portfolio
strategy. Such a strategy would give greater weight to long-term desired
outcomes and risks than is likely to come from suppliers being driven largely or
solely by near-term competitive market pressures. It would include a regional
Research, Demonstration and Commercialization (RD&C) element.
"Sustainability" is distinct from regional self-sufficiency in that it does not
exclude imported supplies but discriminates as to sources. Equally it assumes
an intermediate term mix of sustainable and depletable resources.

3. Retain the benefits of the region's existing low cost resources for the region.
4. Assure affordable access to electricity for consumers with the least market
power.
5. Substitute efficiently functioning competitive markets for regulated Dower
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consistent with other goals. Achieve lower
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power costs through improved efficiency of planning, development and
operations. Assure the maximum ability for consumers to choose among power
products, services and terms they desire.
6. Assure adeauacy of supply and reliability of operation to the extent that the
competitive market may fail to do so.
7. Assure fairness -- no one group benefits excessively at the expense of others.
8. Provide accountability for the legitimate costs of the power system and other
river users. Users pay for their own uses of the river.

Outcomes
We will not attempt to cover all issues under discussion in the Regional Review.
Some outcomes from this amended approach will be familiar to Review members, as
they parallel panel discussions to date. We will begin, however, with those that are
different in significant ways.
The Federal hydropower generating system -- facilities ownership,
1.
and power marketing function -- should remain in public ownership.
The rationale underlying this conclusion is simple and historical. Conflicts exist
between different operational uses of the river, and the greatest conflicts are between
power generation and sustenance of fish and other aquatic life. The shifting of the
natural hydrograph from spring and summer forward into winter use for generation,
combined with food-web impacts of transforming a free-flowing river into a series of
slackwater pools, have altered biological systems profoundly 2 . The pressure to
generate more power combined with the value to the power system of flexibility to
meet demand and follow load, almost always operate adverse to the workings of the
evolved ecosystem.

2 The recent report of the Independent Scientific Group to the Power Council suggests that the key to
restoring salmonid populations likely lies in restoring their environment — headwaters, mainstem and
estuary -- to conditions more closely resembling those to which the species evolved over several
thousands of years. The additional costs of responding to this counsel are liable to be significantly in
excess of current regional commitments.
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The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), the Bureau of Reclamation
(BuRec) and the Corps of Engineers (COE) are three federal agencies among the
many government entities charged with managing elements of the river's flow. Each
has its own constituencies that pressure it to maximize the benefits it extracts from the
river. At the same time, all three agencies are accountable to the Federal government
(and to a much lesser extent, to the four Northwest states and to Native American tribal
governments). As such, they must balance the public interest against the often
conflicting counterclaims of their private interest constituencies.
What's most needed on the river is greater unification of purpose in river
operations (associated with the often-heard demand that "someone should be in
charge of salmon recovery"), and greater accountability of management actions to that
purpose.
What's not needed is further fragmentation of authority. Particularly not needed
is shifting hydropower generation -- or the marketing of that power -- to a private entity
that has the principal goal of maximizing power revenues and no public body
stewardship obligations, thereby escalating the conflict between water for power and
water for biological sustainability.
This conclusion argues for preserving BPA or establishing a successor agency
charged, as was BPA originally, with the marketing of federal hydropower, subject not
just to a Power Council Fish and Wildlife Program but to a governance structure that
can effectively balance off private economic uses of the river with the primary
management objective of biological sustainability. The new BPA may, however, be far
smaller than its present incarnation, and more passive as a marketplace participant
(see #2 below).
Conflicts over river operations should be resolved within a single governance
structure (such as a successor to the Northwest Power Planning Council) and
executed within a single public agency. National and regional interests both need to
be adequately represented in such policymaking; hence composition of the
governance body must include federal, state, and tribal representation. It must act
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consistent with legislated standards that assure conservation of the river's biology,

then allocation to other uses.
The alternative has been proposed of shifting ownership of assets (facilities
and/or marketing rights) to a private company or customer cooperative, and relying on
superimposing regulatory constraints on its operations to protect the river. This is
essentially the structure the region relies on today: weak enforcement tools to bring
agencies into "consistency" with Power Council Fish and Wildlife Program.
A regulatory approach is not without merit if regulations can be modified
periodically, to reflect new science or other circumstances, and if effective enforcement
is provided for. But removing or minimizing the source of conflict is preferable to
indefinite mediation between competing interests and authorities. Otherwise the
parties that purchase power marketing rights will, quite rationally, seek maximum
predictability from the river operators, while preserving to themselves maximum
flexibility to respond to market conditions. One uncertainty is preferable to two. Any
financing sources for such a private "BPA" will seek to fix fish operations costs or shift
the risk elsewhere. Once the risk allocation was fixed, the private power marketers
would have every incentive to induce hydroproject operators to maximize output.
Certainly a public agency with power marketing responsibilities will be impelled
by the same calculation, as BPA showed last year by seeking a Congressional "cap"
on its fish cost exposure. BPA in fact secured some relief, but the obligation remains
with BPA (and the Treasury) that higher flows or other measures for fish survival could
be called for and would have to be balanced against reserving the same water for
power generation. BPA must manage both market risks and river conservation risks.
So it should.
The wisdom of a separate regional process for exploring basin governance
issues has to be questioned at this point. If the Regional Review decides to shift
hydropower system assets into private hands, governance options are materially
narrowed. If the governance deliberations insist nonetheless on public control and
ownership, the industry structure devised by the Regional Review might have to be
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dismantled and reconstructed to accommodate this. The Regional Review and
Basin Governance processes should be reconstituted as a single enquiry
at the earliest possible juncture.
Preservation of BPA in some modified form capable of marketing federal base
system power (at least) will have consequences with respect to power industry
designs and operations. These are discussed below.

2.

The value of the public investment in the Federal power system
should be guarded, enhanced and reserved to the region and to the
public interest.
This proposition invites the question whether there is residual economic value
in the system. Yet any number of analyses demonstrate that the underlying
hydropower base is still very low cost and well able to compete in any foreseeable
market conditions. Load following and other power quality services are likewise highly
marketable. The region's equity interest in the transmission system has value, for
which the region and federal government should insist on compensation in any
transfer or alternate operating model.
There is general agreement that the federal hydropower system, exclusive of
WPPSS and its debt, is a source of highly competitive power3.
We are two decades away from liquidating WPPSS debt, at which time no other
generating resource on the horizon will be able to undersell the hydropower system's
output. A BPA free to meet the market and sell at market-driven prices is potentially a
net revenue producer (after meeting its costs, including Treasury payments). Those
net revenues can be preserved for regional public purposes, or they can be shifted to
customers in the form of dividends or lower rates, or they can be captured by the
federal government for other discretionary purposes. All parties should be interested
3 Removing WPPSS debt from BPA's annual revenue requirement would likely result in power costs
below 2e/KwH. Annual costs to amortize the debt from WPPSS 1, 2 and 3 are between $500mm and
$600mm through 2012, ramping down thereafter through 2018. This amount is between 25% and 30%
of BPA's annual revenue requirement. The benefits of liquidating this capital debt will be partially offset by
accumulations for decommissioning expenses.
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in maximizing BPA's value so long as higher priority values are not adversely affected
thereby.
Any proposal to privatize or otherwise dispose of such a valuable public asset
must carry a substantial burden of proof. It must establish that the public is receiving
the full value (including allocation of system risks) of the foregone revenue stream in
exchange, and that other public values are not compromised in unacceptable ways
(e.g., biological effects from river operations commitments included in a transaction). It
must not succeed by leaving liabilities and costs with the Federal government while
conveying income-generating assets at a discounted price to private parties (or parties
with narrowly defined purposes, such as publicly-owned utilities).
For example, it has been suggested that the dams themselves carry fish
recovery liabilities that make them difficult to sell, but there might well be buyers for a
power marketing authority that was severed from these liabilities. Alternately, a deeply
discounted front-end price for the federal assets could serve the same purpose: to
leave fish recovery risks, or the cost of carrying those risks, with the government while
moving the revenue-producing assets into private ownership.
Either such arrangement might well be attractive to private buyers and lenders.
Either would provide the means for accelerated Treasury repayment, and would be a
major step toward a largely privatized and competitive power market. But these gains
would come at a price. Aside from the consequences for river management, the
transaction would transfer a stream of potential future net revenues from public into
private hands. Capital for future public investment in goals such as energy efficiency
and renewable resource technologies would flow instead to the separate owners.
Arguably such a transaction could be justified economically if the government
and region are receiving full economic value in exchange for the assets. However,
most speculation involves transactions in which, for example, the system is acquired at
a price that meets lenders' debt service coverage ratios (e.g., at a discounted price that
assures debt will be serviced under conservative conditions of reduced output or
revenues, while securing upside potential to buyers). Alternately, fish restoration
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liabilities beyond a capped level are left to the Federal Treasury.
Even in the unlikely event of a transaction that resulted in the government
receiving full value for hydropower system assets, the consequences for river
management and protection of the river's biological integrity (discussed above) are
sufficiently discouraging by themselves.
Whether the hypothetical net revenues ever develop, and how soon, depends
on many factors, not the least of which is what additional burdens would remain with
the hydropower system. Of these, the costs of mitigation of impacts on fish and
wildlife are as intrinsic to hydropower operations as exhaust emissions are to fossil
fuel plants, and should under no circumstances be detached.
Another factor of significance is the potential for the hydropower system to be
displaced by new electrical technologies (e.g., fuel cells) that would render the old
system uneconomic. Keeping the existing system in public hands is not without risk.
However, there are no such technology trajectories threatening at present.
How such net revenues might be managed and distributed is discussed below
(under "Governance").
. The list of other costs, transfer payments, or risks is long and frequently
controversial. WPPSS debt (and current above-market operating expense margins),
irrigation and low-density discounts, residential exchange, regional and public
preference, rural delivery subsidies, all contribute to pushing BPA base hydropower
costs upward. BPA regional investments in conservation and renewable technologies
that may be cost-effective long-term still shift costs back into today's short-term
competitive markets.
In addition to BPA's ongoing internal cost-reduction actions, the agency and the
region need to act to eliminate or, if appropriate, shift much of this cost overburden
back to current beneficiaries.
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WPPSS: All or some part of WPPSS nuclear plant debt might be assigned to
the utility customers that participated in the net-billing arrangements for the plant; or it
might be treated as a legitimate stranded investment and defrayed through a uniform
wires charge (as has been proposed elsewhere). BPA has vacated any residual
WPPSS obligations for its Direct Service Industrial (DSO customers who execute new
contracts; most have. It proposes similar immunity for its utility customers who sign
new contracts. If these exemptions stand, spreading any WPPSS debt adjudged
"stranded" becomes more difficult because it will have to be charged to fewer
customers, particularly to residential and small business users with less market power
and fewer market choices.
BPA and the region should consider whether a preference customer that
declines to carry its proportionate share of this debt (by refusing to pay a stranded
investment wires charge, or by reducing its load placed on BPA) whould not thereby
forego its future rights to preference status and the access to post-WPPSS power costs
that may obtain in the future.
Immediately, BPA and the region should revisit whether WNP2 is ever likely to
produce competitive power, especially in light of the winter reliability exposure of 1100
MW of capacity in one resource. Despite recent performance improvements, the
operating cost of power generated remains above market (capital debt costs are
already sunk and must be liquidated independent of a termination decision). A
managed shutdown would impose significant front-end costs on a BPA struggling to
be competitive in the near-term, but could improve the agency's competitiveness
thereafter. Recent BPA-sponsored analysis indicates these cost offsets approximately
cancel each other out, suggesting that the case for termination has grown stronger.
Subsidies and Transfer Payments: Subsidies should be subject to "sunset" and
rampdown except as, under reexamination, they are warranted for contemporary
public policy reasons. These include power sales discounts, residential exchange
costs, and continuing obligations to retire debt incurred for irrigation facilities (which
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should be carried by the beneficiaries).
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Public Preference: The logic underlying public preference is not compelling
today as it was fifty years ago. Public utilities in any event will be under considerable
marketplace pressure to achieve efficiencies by any means including merger with
other public bodies, or with private ones. Already that pressure has prompted the
rational response of seeking other suppliers than BPA, although BPA is still held to its
obligation to meet these customers' requirements at cost.
Proposals to modify or eliminate public preference will be controversial. It may
be that no significant legislative changes are possible without compromising the push
to market competition by preserving this institution in modified form. However, BPA
must at least have reciprocity with its customers. An obligation to sell must be met with
a commensurate commitment to buy. If customers can seek a market clearing price for
purchases outside BPA, then BPA should be allowed the reciprocal right to sell at
market rather than at cost. Preference customers that commit to BRA as their supplier
in the near and intermediate terms might thereby secure their future preference status.
In a competitive marketplace, however, preference should entitle purchases at a
discount that reflects the value to BPA and the region of such reliable commitments,
not the right to purchase at cost.
Rural Delivery Subsidies ("postage stamp" transmission rates): This is an issue
for a TRANSCO successor to BPA (or for a "BTA"), not for a BPA engaged in power
marketing. The applicable general principle for a privately-owned TRANSCO is that
transmission pricing is a function of cost plus a reasonable rate of return, and therefore
the price to any customer should not be less than the cost to provide service to that
customer. The exception to this principle should be that a minimum level of electrical
service should be available at an affordable cost to any residential consumer, on a
"lifeline" rate if necessary. Such an exception may supplant a low density subsidy
with another directed to low income consumers, irrespective of whether the customer
is rural or urban, and whether the supplier is the Federal system or another supplier.
It is entirely possible that the effects of reconnecting transmission rates to costof-service will have uneven effects in rural areas. Rates may drop in areas near
generation resources and rise elsewhere. Public policies to moderate and ramp in
effects need to be developed.
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3.
BPA's power marketing role needs to be redesigned to limit its
influence in competitive power markets.
All other things being equal, there is little rationale for a federally-owned power
supplier competing in unregulated wholesale power markets. Neither BPA nor any
other party in the region can untangle the web of special advantages (e.g., Treasury
borrowing) and disadvantages (e.g., preference obligations). The obstacles to a
level playing field" are daunting at least.
But all other things were not equal in the 1930's when BPA was designed, and
they are not today. The rationale for preserving BPA (albeit in modified form) is
outlined above.
The Regional Review is considering different models for power sales
transactions, including a central pooling arrangement, bilateral contracts, or a variation
on these forms. If BPA remains a power marketing function, the bilateral approach is
most likely to raise objections to the agency using market power -- for example,
packaging ancillary services with bulk power supplies -- to acquire undue competitive
advantages.
A pooling approach, whatever its perceived disadvantages to other suppliers,
could be designed such that BPA "delivers" its power for sale to the pool, then takes
the price derived by the pool in its subsequent sales transactions. While BPA still
influences the market and price (by virtue of the size of its deliveries), it is nbt
competing head-to-head for customers with other regional suppliers. The pool would
have to be designed to assure that a large supplier such as BPA could not influence
pool operations by timing its deliveries or otherwise distorting pool workings.
Alternately, BPA could be positioned to auction its available supplies and
services in a format that allows distribution utilities, customer coops, direct purchasers
and others to bid, with no restrictions on resale. This assumes distinctions between
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wholesale and retail markets continue to blur. Under an auction approach, BPA would
have to package most of its products in standard shapes and sizes that could then be
repackaged by the market to meet the requirements of distribution utilities and large
end users. Product terms and duration of sales would be established by the market
into which BPA sells. The unbundling already underway at BPA leads in exactly the
right direction. Short-term products could still be sold on spot markets as they are
now.
An auction approach assumes also that the universe of available buyers of BPA
power expands -- through open access, development of futures markets, etc. -- such
that customers are less able to wait BPA out and force it to sell or spill.
The US Forest Service already uses this approach to sell merchantable timber
from National Forest lands. The Service has proven over the years that an auction
approach can be carried out efficiently or inefficiently, taking into account
environmental effects or indifferent to them. The technique itself is neutral and
accessible.
In both pool and auction approaches, BPA would become a price taker with a
market role that is passive, although not without influence. This role assumes that
through a combination of cost of service reductions, eliminating or reducing transfer
payments and liabilities, and recapture of stranded investment if necessary, BPA can
occupy this role. The assumption will be greeted with considerable skepticism, yet we
believe further analysis will be able to describe the actions that make this approach
feasible. We suggest several in this paper.
In a reduced supply role, there is no need for BPA to have either obligation or
authority to acquire new resources to meet load (although an exception might be
made to acquire resources that allow existing resources to be reshaped into highervalue products). BPA would have no obligation to meet any customer's
requirements, which will instead be met through the actions of the power marketplace.
Smaller publicly-owned utilities, most of which want the freedom today to buy
elsewhere if BPA costs are not competitive, will be subject to the full discipline of the
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market that comes along with its benefits. Such small customers can consolidate, or
form purchasing cooperatives, or take other actions to increase their market power as
necessary.
Preference customers that wish to retain their commitments of BPA power
supplies (perhaps at a discount to a market-set price) could do so on a take-or-pay
basis that is fully reciprocal (SPA gets an assured load, customers an assured supply,
and both have greater price predictability than the market would offer).
Implicit in this new BPA role is the right for the agency to realize revenues from
market-priced products, a departure from cost-based BPA pricing and ratemaking.
The ability to realize net revenues from competitive products is essential to
subsequent proposals to employ such net revenues, if any, to realize certain regional
public purposes.
A market-passive SPA is also a much smaller SPA. Power marketing and rate
case staffs would have far diminished roles. Energy services product lines would not
be pursued. Other functions not essential to moving power to market should also be
accessible to downsizing (see Transmission, below).

BPA should divest itself of its transmission assets, which should be
joined with all other available regional transmission facilities in an
independently-operated TRANSCO. However, BPA and the region
should receive and retain full value of the region's equity investment in
4.

these assets.
There is no substantial public policy rationale for a Federal agency acting as a
(or "the") regional transmission entity. There is no river to protect. Private ownership
and operation of transmission facilities is the rule rather than the exception nationwide,
and always has been. SPA was a convenient tool for financing the large regional
investment in these facilities, and it was the only utility with sufficiently regional scope
to operate the system.
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But BPA's financing advantage no longer obtains, and in fact its transmission
borrowing authority from the Federal Treasury is limited and unlikely to grow. A
region-wide, privately-owned, FERC-regulated transmission company is easily
conceivable. Such an entity would have the assets (including a captive market)
against which to raise additional capital as needed for system growth and efficiency
improvements.
Open access and the operational independence of a regional TRANSCO (or
IGO) from its generating and consuming customers are critical features. Neither is very
controversial anymore, although the task remains to shape these for optimum
efficiency and for neutrality among the parties with interests at stake.
More important to the approach taken by this paper are the terms of the
transaction under which BPA (and other owners) commit, and possibly convey, their
transmission assets. Some of these assets have been substantially amortized; others
may have limited equity and a large residual debt. Some are efficient and have low
operating costs; others may impose large line losses, have higher operating costs, or
be in line for substantial and costly maintenance. A transaction in which all assets
were assigned the same value would be inequitable.
Instead, the different systems should be valued by an independent agent
against common, agreed-to economic and technical standards. Shares in the
TRANSCO should be awarded based on the values ascertained. Services from the
TRANSCO would be priced on a cost-of-service plus reasonable rate of return,
regulated by FERC. Dividends would be declared to distribute the return, in proportion
to the shares (e.g., value contributed into the TRANSCO).
In this way BPA and other contributors with significant amounts of equity
investment in transmission assets may be able to realize on some part or all of that
value without compromising the independence of the TRANSCO. BPA obligations to
the Treasury continue unaffected, secured by BPA's ownership share in the
TRANSCO. The ability of BPA to generate net revenues for the benefit of the region is
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commensurately improved (although to what degree depends on how FERC treats the
assembled TRANSCO assets).
Valuations of transmission assets should occurr even if the assignment to the
IGO is of operating responsibility but not ownership.
Nothing in this approach presumes that transmission assets transferred from
BPA to a new entity are beyond reach of a stranded investment charge if this becomes
necessary to address WPPSS debt. Federal generation and transmission facilities
were developed as a system, not as stand-alone components, and as assets should
continue to be so regarded during transition to open markets.

5.

BPA net revenues, if any, should be available to leverage longer
investment horizons for regional developers/suppliers of energy
efficiency and renewable resources.

Conservation and renewable resource investments will operate at a
disadvantage in short-term competitive energy markets. They are capital intensive
and frequently have longer payback periods, creating stranded-investment risks ( of
default; of customers switching suppliers; of supercession by new technologies)
unattractive to investors and lenders alike. Allocation of benefits and recovery of costs
and returns are often complicated by diverse ownership and financing arrangements.
Utility investments in these resources put upward pressure on near-term rates.
Customer investment strategies face high discount rates for individuals end
competition for scarce investment capital among businesses.
These are all real market factors that legitimately influence investment choices,
and that must be either accepted or offset by market intervention. For the last 15 years,
the region has relied on public policy determinations of what regional conservation
investment level is cost-effective; and has used utility regulatory powers to induce
conservation acquisition at that level. The spread between average power costs (low)

fl
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and marginal costs of new resources (high) permitted significant conservation
investment levels, to the lasting benefit of the region.
Elements of that strategy remain valid (e.g., codes; design intervention), but as a
whole it will have to be reconstructed to be consistent with changes in the power
industry, and in cost/risk calculations. Both economic and environmental rationales for
conservation acquisition need attention.
Substantial amounts of cost-effective conservation remain in the region, and are
augmented as efficiency technologies advance. The Power Council staff draft 1996
Power Plan identifies 1575 aMW of regional conservation that is cost-effective on a 20year investment horizon At the same time the staff and most other observers
acknowledge that only a fraction of this is likely to be acquired through utility programs.
Renewable energy suppliers relied initially on public policies (e.g., PURPA) to
drive down unit costs of technologies and to open utility markets. The objective was
stand-alone cost-effective renewables, an objective that has been frustrated by
declines in market prices for power from conventional (gas) technologies that have
undercut the cost reductions achieved by renewables developers.
New regional acquisitions of renewable resource projects are stopped cold.
Projects already on utility books are being downsized, their costs reduced and spread,
their prospects clouded.
This paper has assumed a public policy goal of "long-term energy sustainability
through a near-term resource investment portfolio strategy". Such a strategy would
accept longer payback periods and higher levels of technological risk in return for
resource diversity, technological gains, operating experience, and the environmental
and other attributes of renewable technologies and efficiency improvements. Such a
strategy requires investment dollars and investment vehicles. Where are they to be
found?
One option under discussion involves a non-bypassable "wires charge",
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wherein all consumers remit a small sum tied to their energy use (or capacity; or
simply a connection charge). The approach is promising despite numerous issues of
administration, fuels coverage, investment (or grant) criteria, and so on which this
paper will not address. The largest hurdle will be persuading the legislatures of the
four states that such an assessment, in amounts sufficient to undertake a meaningful
investment program, is politically attractive. Absent some external incentive or
leverage, the political prospects are not encouraging.
Such leverage might be provided from the net revenues of a restructured BPA.
A regional/Federal governing board (see Ownership and Governance, below) could
allocate funding to a state in proportion to that state's commitment to raising and
applying wires charge (or other) revenues to a conservation/renewables investment
strategy consistent with regional standards. While available BPA funding might be
limited initially and vary from year to year, its leveraging effect over time could be
substantial.
Absent another identifiable source of funds for such leveraging investments, the
region's near-term future is unlikely to contain any new renewable initiatives.
Significant amounts (20% to 30% of the projected cost-effective total, per NPPC staff))
of near-term conservation resource may be acquired from market forces and residual
utility actions. For the remaining 70% to 80%, few tools or incentives are easily
identifiable if there is not a public policy commitment, backed up by funding, to mitigate
the risks and longer investment horizons of these resources.
There should be state-by-state policies applicable to all energy
6.
suppliers that assure a minimum level of affordable service accessible to
all individual consumers.
Low-income residential and rural customers may be shocked to discover how
unforgiving a competitive electric power market can be after the insulated comfort of
regulated monopoly markets. While many, perhaps most customers will benefit from
lower rates and improved customer choice, those with the least market power may find
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costs shifted dramatically in their direction. Some of this will be justified on a strict
cost-to-serve basis; some part will be traceable to different capabilities among
customers to make the market work efficiently for then "Redlining" of services to
certain neighborhoods and communities could occur.
Offsetting these effects could be aggregation services that emerge to
intermediate between pools of small consumers and the market. "Distribution utilities"
will likely evolve to the same market.
The issue is whether public policies ought to act to redress differences in market
power, and to assure that a minimum level of affordable service is available to all;
possibly some variation on lifeline rates and service; or authorizing, even sponsoring,
consumer aggregation services. Such policies should be indifferent to a rural or urban
address (rates that reflect cost-of-service in rural areas are already standard

distribution utility policy in any event).
States adopting such policies should apply the obligations (or collect levies for
redistribution) equitably from all energy suppliers. If assessments are imposed at the
wholesale level, BPA should be treated as any wholesale supplier.
7.

Governance of Columbia River operations, including shared

ownership of Federal hydroelectric system assets, watershed restoration
and maintenance (and oversight of relevant Federal management and
oversight agencies), and long-term power planning, should be the•

responsibility of a reorganized Northwest Power Planning Council that
includes Federal, State and Tribal representation. The Federal
Government should agree that any BPA net revenues generated are
available for use within the region only.
To whom does the Columbia River belong? Who is responsible for its
maintenance? Who benefits from the wealth it generates? The answers to these
questions are fundamental to determining governance architecture and authorities.
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This paper argues that the river belongs not only to those who live in the lands it
drains, but to the nation also, and to succeeding generations of Northwesterners,
citizens of the United States, and of Canada. Those who live in the Columbia Basin -tribal and non-tribal peoples -- should expect special deference from the two national
governments, and the right to keep within the region the wealth produced by our

investments (through Treasury repayment) in the river. In return our fellow citizens
outside the Basin, and generations to come, are entitled to demand good stewardship
practices and an accounting of our actions to conserve its integrity while we make use
of its bounty.
This answer contains the basis for a different ownership and governance
structure than the fragmented form which evolved over 150 years of Euro-American
development. The full subject is beyond the scope of this paper, which will limit itself
to discussing ownership and operations of the hydroelectric system.

Ownership: We have argued above the importance of hydropower system
assets and marketing responsibilities remaining in public ownership. Presently those
assets are 100% federally-owned. BPA is largely responsible for retiring the federal
debt incurred to construct the projects and transmission system, as well as for system
operating costs. BPA has been self-financing for many years, meeting its obligations
(including debt payments) from power sales revenues. Dam maintenance and
modification work undertaken by the COE and the BuRec is reimbursed from BPA
(without adequate cost-control authority for BPA).
While some power sales revenues derive from sales outside the region, the
preponderance comes from Northwest ratepayers. There is a case to be made that
since regional ratepayers have shared with the Treasury the costs and risks of
developing the system, they should also share ownership. If both ownership and river
stewardship responsibilities are shared among federal, state and tribal sovereignties,
a formal ownership and governance structure reflecting this is an easily supportable
outcome.
As a long-term objective, we propose the shifting of hydropower system
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ownership to a collaborative entity -- a joint ownership and operating agency (J00A) -comprising the federal government, the four states, and representation from the treaty
and trust tribes of the region. Obligations, benefits, liabilities and risks of the system
would be assigned to this entity. The federal government would participate in
decisions over system operations and allocation of costs and benefits, but as a coowner (rather than, as at present, non-resident sole proprietor). It would be agreed
that any net revenues realized would be retained within the region and applied to
mutually-acceptable public purposes (and not captured by the federal Treasury). Net
losses would have to be treated similarly.
The COE and BuRec would continue to operate the projects, and BPA would
market the power, but the agencies would do so subject to the operating plan adopted
by the JO0A. Authority to maintain and to modify the projects would shift to the JO0A,
along with responsibility to cover costs. Coordination and accountability would be
greatly enhanced.4
As an interim step, the federal government could retain system ownership but
execute an agreement with the states that assigned certain system benefits and
liabilities to the JOOA with the representation described above.
Other uses of the river (e.g., flood control, transportation, irrigation) would
continue under appropriate federal and state authorities, but should no longer be
subsidized by the hydropower system. Such uses in any event ought to be paying
their own way or receiving a clear and transparent subsidy from the federal treasury.
The federal government would retain its responsibility on behalf of the nation for
conserving the environmental health of the Columbia River. The JOOA would be
obligated to operate the hydropower system consistent with basin watershed health
standards.
4 It is a highly debatable proposition to place a political body in control of a commercial venture. No less
debatable is the notion of putting a commercial venture in charge of a political/governmental process and
a public value: the use and management of a river ecosystem. Clearly the JOOA would need to be
designed to resist broadening the range of authorized public purposes it would support, in order to avoid
duplicating exactly the layering of subsidies and transfer payments that accumulated at BPA over the
years. This is still the lesser risk, when compared to the risks of commercial pressures on biological
systems that have resulted in the damaged Columbia watershed we confront today.
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Ideally those standards would be developed collaboratively also, by the JO0A
acting as watershed management and conservation council. Each party to the JOOA
would then be responsible for devising and carrying out activities within its purview that bring the watershed into compliance. Federal land and resource management
agencies, along with state and tribal agencies, would be held accountable to their
sovereigns, acting jointly, for failure to act consistent with the region's watershed
management standards and program, or for conditions that are within their authority to
correct but remain out of compliance with the standards.

eTh

Treaty Obligations: The federal government cannot under law assign
elsewhere its treaty obligations, whether to a foreign government or to the treaty tribes.
The actions of the JO0A, watershed standards and a watershed management and
conservation program will need to be subordinate to and consistent with such
obligations. Equally, any new treaty agreements entered into by the federal
government will need to be consistent with regional system operating and watershed
management programs, and should be entered into only after consultation between
the federal government and its JOOA partners.
Compliance with treaty obligations would remain subject to judicial review.
The JOOA and the watershed governance council should at the earliest
occasion seek joint development, with the governments of Canada and British
Columbia. of institutional linkages that provide for trans-boundary coordination of
basin watershed management.
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